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OPEN YOUR MOUTH AND SAY ‘IDEOLOGY’:  PHYSICIANS AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Lauren R. Robbins* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Puppets—those creatures of the theater which are manipulated by 
the puppeteer’s artful hands—have the great potential to communi-
cate ideologies.  In the Middle Ages, puppets were used in churches 
to bring religious lessons to life.1  Bread and Puppet Theater, a pup-
pet troupe established in the 1960s, was known for its protestations of 
American involvement in the Vietnam War and support of causes like 
voter registration and peace.2  Just like puppeteers of the stage who 
communicate ideologies through marionettes and hand puppets, 
some governments attempt to communicate ideologies through their 
citizens.  Physicians, though under state control in some aspects of 
their work, are not puppets of the State.  But some abortion providers 
are used for just this purpose.  These physicians are coming into con-
flict with state governments which are attempting to gain ideological 
control over their speech.  With the state as the puppeteer and ideol-
ogy as the script, physicians’ First Amendment rights are being swept 
into the collateral damage of the abortion war. 
A.  Misinformed Consent 
A South Dakota statute requires all doctors, under threat of crim-
inal punishment, to tell patients seeking an abortion that an “abor-
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tion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human 
being.”3  This forced communication of the term “human being” is a 
statement on when life begins and it goes well beyond the informed 
consent regime that was upheld as constitutional in the Supreme 
Court’s landmark decision of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey.4  This Comment examines whether a State can re-
quire that a doctor communicate to a pregnant patient that her de-
veloping fetus is a “human being,” or whether such a law violates the 
basic tenets of the First Amendment. 
The Eighth Circuit, in Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, 
South Dakota v. Rounds,5 lifted an injunction on South Dakota’s in-
formed consent to abortion statute in 2008, siding with the State and 
thus compelling abortion providers to use the term “human being” as 
included in the script.  The State maintained that its definition of 
“human being” (found in the section of the statute not conveyed to 
the patient) is a scientific one.  But this is not so.  The statute defines 
“human being” as “an individual living member of the species of 
Homo sapiens, including the unborn human being during the entire 
embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full gestation.”6  South 
Dakota’s position was that the use of the term “Homo sapiens” to de-
fine “human being” “establishes the legislative command that the in-
formation to be given to the woman is ‘scientific’ and not philosophi-
cal, moral or theological.”7  But just as calling something blue does 
not make it blue, calling something “science” does not automatically 
make it scientific. 
The law in South Dakota is unique in ways that raise concerns for 
both physicians and patients and it has import well beyond its own 
 
 3 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2009).  The South Dakota statute is controversial for a 
number of different reasons, but this Comment only focuses on the language that con-
veys human being status upon the fetus.  For broad criticisms of the statute, see Robert 
Post, Informed Consent to Abortion:  A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, and Reva B. Siegal, The New Politics of Abortion:  An Equality Analy-
sis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 (arguing that the grow-
ing use of a woman-protective anti-abortion argument reflects a shift from fetal-focused to 
gender-based justifications for abortion regulations). 
 4 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  Interestingly, the South Dakota informed consent statute was origi-
nally virtually the same as that upheld in Casey, but it was later amended to include the 
language at issue in this Comment.  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2003). 
 5 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  
The court stated that the term refers to purely “biology-based” characteristics and does 
not require a physician to address whether a fetus is a “‘whole, separate, unique’ ‘human 
life’ in the metaphysical sense,” citing the statutory definition as justification for the con-
clusion.  Id. at 736 n.9. 
 6 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1(4) (2009). 
 7 Appellants’ Brief at 24, Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (No. 05-3093). 
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state’s borders.  South Dakota may only have one abortion clinic and 
a mere four doctors who will perform the procedure,8 but the impact 
of its law cannot be understated.  Though the statute ostensibly only 
violates the speech rights of these physicians (which is still signifi-
cant), the effects are much broader and pernicious.  “Although some 
may view South Dakota’s restrictive abortion provisions as affecting 
only the 700 or so women who seek an abortion in that state each 
year, such complacency is misplaced,” warns one commentator in the 
New England Journal of Medicine.9  This provision “mark[s] a substantial 
inroad into the physician-patient relationship”10 and ought to raise 
significant concerns for physicians’ speech rights. 
B.  Unconstitutional Scripts 
The Eighth Circuit’s ruling in Rounds has already encouraged 
other States to create statutes with similarly problematic require-
ments.11  I argue that when informed consent statutes use subjective, 
non-scientifically proven terms to describe the fetus and require doc-
tors to convey such terms to their patients, the state compels speech 
that is not only misleading, but ideological.  This ideological speech 
is a clear violation of the First Amendment. 
In Part II, I examine the purpose behind the doctrine of informed 
consent and the extent to which the State may use its police power to 
regulate the practice of medicine in this area.  States do not typically 
have the power to compel individuals to adhere to an ideology,12 but 
in the context of medicine, reasonable regulation may diminish or 
even eliminate a doctor’s right not to be required to endorse pre-
scribed speech.13  In Part III, I detail the progression of cases through 
the courts which have led to the current state of the doctrine and re-
 
 8 See Evelyn Nieves, S.D. Makes Abortion Rare Through Laws and Stigma; Out-of-State Doctors 
Come Weekly to 1 Clinic, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter, Nieves, S.D. Makes 
Abortion Rare]; Evelyn Nieves, S.D. Abortion Bill Takes Aim at ‘Roe’; Senate Ban Does Not Except 
Rape, Incest, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2006, at A1.  In fact, these four doctors are not even res-
idents of the state; they are flown in from Minnesota on a rotating basis because no doc-
tor within state lines will perform an abortion.  See Nieves, S.D. Makes Abortion Rare, supra. 
 9 Zita Lazzarini, South Dakota’s Abortion Script—Threatening the Physician-Patient Relationship, 
359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2189, 2191 (2008). 
 10 Id. 
 11 See infra Part VI. 
 12 This free speech right applies not only to expressions of value or opinion, but also to 
statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid.  See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 13 See infra Part III.B.3–5 (discussing the implications of the Casey decision). 
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cent legislative actions.14  Though rarely the focal point of such cases, 
the doctor plays a major character in the jurisprudence because so 
often the laws regulate what she can and cannot do. 
The question of when life begins is central to the dispute over the 
term “human being,” and, in Part IV, I look at how both science and 
the law have approached the issue.  Based on this analysis, I conclude 
that the term “human being” is not scientific and that debate over the 
beginning of life appropriately belongs to such realms as religion and 
moral belief; not that of the clinic.  In Part V, I turn to the informed 
consent statutes that have presented conflicts with the First Amend-
ment because of their inclusion of the term “human being.”  Even 
with the inclusion of a specific definition for the term, this is essen-
tially a linguistic artifice that allows the State’s ideology into the doc-
tor’s medical dealings. 
Finally, in Part VI, I highlight just some of the implications that 
the language in the South Dakota statute raises for the practice of 
medicine in general and abortion access in particular.  Physician 
speech rights are not often the focus of the debate around abortion 
but they absolutely cannot be neglected or wrongly seen as peripheral 
to the main dispute.  Indeed, ignoring the issue is antithetical to the 
principles of liberty upon which this country was founded and which 
Justice Kennedy has affirmed includes “the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence.”15  Doctors cannot and must not be stripped of 
this right. 
II.  REGULATING INFORMED CONSENT 
Thirty-three states currently have laws or policies that require 
heightened forms of informed consent before a woman may get an 
abortion.16  But in twenty-three of these states, provisions include at 
least some information that does not align with the fundamental 
 
 14 See Mark G. Kuczewski, Can Communitarianism End the Shrill and Interminable Public Debates?  
Abortion as a Case-in-Point, in BIOETHICS:  ANCIENT THEMES IN CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 180 
(Mark G. Kuczewski & Ronald Polansky eds., 2002) (“[B]eginning with Roe and following 
upon each new subtlety that the Court adds . . . a new round of shrill public chatter be-
gins, seemingly gaining impetus for its hostile tone from the subtle reasoning of the Jus-
tices.”) (citations to subsequent cases omitted).  This “shrill public chatter” is no doubt 
part of what leads state legislators to amend their informed consent laws. 
 15 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 16 Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Counseling Policies and the Fundamen-
tal Principles of Informed Consent, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 6, 7–8, (2007), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/10/4/gpr100406.pdf (detailing the multiple re-
quirements of states’ statutes in a comprehensive chart).  In all other states, general 
common law informed consent requirements apply. 
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purpose of the medical doctrine.17  The central premise of informed 
consent is that in order to respect a patient’s autonomy, a physician 
has certain communicative responsibilities.18  To adhere to the doc-
trine and avoid malpractice, a physician should instruct a patient 
about his or her diagnosis, the recommended intervention and alter-
natives, the benefits and risks of such actions, and the implications 
should no intervention be attempted.19  The doctrine of informed 
consent was developed to increase the flow of important information 
from physicians to patients so as to “decrease the imbalance in know-
ledge and power [between them] and protect patients from physician 
coercion.”20  But some doctors, at the behest of the state, are forced 
to go beyond their job descriptions and onto a stage that is scripted 
by ideology. 
A.  The Development of Informed Consent 
The doctrine of informed consent might be assumed by many to 
be a founding precept of medicine, but it is actually more of a recent 
creation.  Less than 200 years ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., 
warned physicians that “[y]our patient has no more right to all the 
truth you know than he has to all the medicine in your saddle-
bags . . . . He should get only as much as is good for him.”21  Non-
disclosure, it would seem, was the best medicine.  Even the American 
Medical Association’s first Code of Ethics cautioned physicians to 
“avoid all things which have a tendency to discourage the patient and 
to depress his spirits.”22  As is clear by the web of statutes and profes-
sional requirements in place today, much has changed with respect to 
 
 17 Id. 
 18 For more on the history and the evolution of informed consent, see generally JESSICA W. 
BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT:  LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 2001); 
RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 
(1986); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT, ch. I, 1 (2d ed., the Johns 
Hopkins Univ. Press 2002) (1984); STEPHEN WEAR, INFORMED CONSENT:  PATIENT 
AUTONOMY AND CLINICIAN BENEFICENCE WITHIN HEALTH CARE (2d ed. 1998). 
 19 See WEAR, supra note 18, at 10. 
 20 Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the Right to Receive 
Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 230 (1994). 
 21 Ben A. Rich, Prognostication in Clinical Medicine:  Prophesy or Professional Responsibility?, 23 J. 
LEGAL MED. 297, 317 (2002) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., The Young Practitioner, 
in MEDICAL ESSAYS, 1842–1882, 370, 388 (Classics Med. Library ed. 1987)). 
 22 W. John Thomas, Informed Consent, the Placebo Effect, and the Revenge of Thomas Percival, 22 J. 
LEGAL MED. 313, 315 (2001) (quoting Code of Ethics (1847) Art. I(4), reprinted in 
AMERICAN MEDICAL ETHICS REVOLUTION:  HOW THE AMA’S CODE OF ETHICS HAS 
TRANSFORMED PHYSICIANS’ RELATIONSHIPS TO PATIENTS, PROFESSIONALS, AND SOCIETY 
324, 325 (Robert B. Baker et al. eds., 1999)). 
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what information the patient should expect to receive so that he or 
she can give informed consent. 
Change began in 1905, when an Illinois court of appeals stated 
that “the right to the inviolability of his person” is a citizen’s greatest 
right and “necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon . . . to violate 
without permission the bodily integrity of his patient.”23  This recogni-
tion of a patient’s autonomy and right to control what happens to his 
or her body was a key step towards increasing the amount of informa-
tion given to a patient before a medical procedure.  That same year, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a patient “must be con-
sulted, and his consent given, before a physician may operate upon 
him.”24  Change was afoot in medicine; however, the major decision 
on informed consent did not come until over half a century later. 
Canterbury v. Spence,25 decided in 1972, changed the face of the ju-
risprudence on this issue.  Judge Robinson, of the D.C. Circuit Court, 
called for the law to set a disclosure standard for doctors.  On the is-
sue of informed consent, the court stated that “[t]he root premise [in 
the doctrine] is the concept, fundamental in American jurispru-
dence, that ‘[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has 
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.’”26  This 
respect for a patient’s right to self-determination, said the court, 
“demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which 
physicians may or may not impose upon themselves.”27 
The laws of informed consent today vary across jurisdictions but 
always rest on three unchanging elements:  capacity, voluntariness, 
and disclosure.  That is, patients must (1) possess the capacity to 
make decisions about their care, (2) participate voluntarily in these 
decisions, and (3) be provided with adequate, appropriate informa-
tion to facilitate decision making.28  Central to the doctrine is that co-
ercion, misrepresentation, and manipulation all negate the element 
of free choice required for medical procedures.29 
 
 23 Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (Ill. App. Ct. 1905) (concerning a doctor who per-
formed a hysterectomy on a patient without fully informing her beforehand). 
 24 Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 14 (Minn. 1905). 
 25 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (involving the failure 
of a surgeon to advise his patient of the risk of potential paralysis for a medical proce-
dure). 
 26 Id. at 780 (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)). 
 27 Id. at 784. 
 28 See Gold & Nash, supra note 16, at 7. 
 29 See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 63 (1982) (“A 
choice that has been coerced, or that resulted from serious manipulation of a person’s 
ability to make an intelligent and informed decision, is not the person’s own free 
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B.  Informed Consent to Abortion Statutes 
In many states, informed consent to abortion is different from in-
formed consent to other medical procedures.  Shortly after Roe v. 
Wade30 was decided, the Supreme Court held that a State may require 
that a woman give her voluntary and informed consent to an abortion 
procedure even if such stringent consent is not required for other 
types of procedures.31  Later, in Casey, the Court seemed to dismiss 
the idea that consent to the abortion procedure was constitutionally 
unique and that it would warrant different consent requirements.32  
Though on the surface this would seem to imply equal treatment for 
all medical procedures, the problem was that it did not consider the 
strong disagreement over what constitutes scientific fact and what 
constitutes ideology in the context of abortion counseling specifically.  
Abortion providers, such as those in South Dakota, are therefore 
placed squarely into a maelstrom of conflicting opinions and charged 
debate. 
Though courts have held that a doctor is not obligated to com-
municate dangers “of which persons of average sophistication are 
aware,”33 it seems that with abortion statutes in particular, a physician 
is required to share, in increasing detail, information which the 
woman of average sophistication would already know:  that preg-
nancy, if not terminated or miscarried, eventually results in the birth 
of a baby.  These required communications may in fact stem from 
some states’ desires to encourage continuation of pregnancies and 
discourage abortions.  Although states may discourage abortions, 
such disclosures result in a breed of informed consent statute that 
glaringly stands out from all others. 
 
choice”); see also Robert E. Powell, Consent to Operative Procedures, 21 MD. L. REV. 181, 203 
(1961). 
 30 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that the right of privacy found in the Constitution is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy). 
 31 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976) (“[W]e see no con-
stitutional defect in requiring [informed consent] only for some types of surgery as, for 
example, an intracardiac procedure, or where the surgical risk is elevated above a speci-
fied mortality level, or, for that matter, for abortions.”). 
 32 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (“[A] requirement that 
a doctor give a woman certain information as part of obtaining her consent to an abor-
tion is, for constitutional purposes, no different from a requirement that a doctor give 
certain specific information about any medical procedure.”). 
 33 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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C.  Statutory Interpretation 
The problem in South Dakota is that an ideological term has been 
cleverly cloaked in scientific language by means of statutory defini-
tion.  The statute defines “human being” as “an individual living 
member of the species of Homo sapiens, including the unborn hu-
man being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertiliza-
tion to full gestation.”34  The Eighth Circuit in Rounds cited South 
Dakota’s “well-settled canon of statutory interpretation”35 that as long 
as a term is defined by statute, that statutory definition is control-
ling.36  The court of appeals also noted that the Supreme Court itself 
has emphasized the controlling nature of statutory definitions, citing 
Stenberg v. Carhart, in which the Court stated that “when a statute in-
cludes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it 
varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.”37 
There is, of course, a crucial difference between a court’s follow-
ing a statutory definition of a term and a doctor being forced to con-
vey a term which, on its own, is undoubtedly laden with multiple in-
terpretations.  Just because a state defines a controversial term in the 
buried fine print of a statute does not make it any less ideological.  
When the term is lifted from its glossary context and placed into the 
mouth of a physician, it loses its supposedly scientific couching.  If a 
state truly wants the patient to understand that a human fetus is an 
“individual living member of the species Homo sapiens,”38 then that 
should be the language in the doctor’s script.39  To mandate other-
wise is potentially manipulative of a woman’s understanding of the 
term and undeniably misleading.  The State’s contention that use of 
 
 34 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1 (2009). 
 35 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 36 The South Dakota Supreme Court has explicitly stated that “statutes mean what they say 
and that legislators have said what they meant.”  Gloe v. Union Ins. Co., 694 N.W.2d 252, 
260 (S.D. 2005) (citation omitted). 
 37 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000).  This case cites Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484–85 (1987) (“It 
is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that 
term.”) and Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392–93, n.10 (1979) (“As a rule, ‘a defini-
tion which declares what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated.’”).  
It is noteworthy that these chosen citations note only what must be excluded from interpre-
tation; not what must be included. 
 38 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1 (2009). 
 39 After all, to determine a compelled disclosure’s constitutionality, “the meaning of the 
disclosure must be ascertained in light of how it would be understood by a reasonable 
person, not in terms of how a state legislature might arbitrarily stipulate its meaning.” 
Post, supra note 3, at 957. 
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the definition resolves any dispute over ideology is “overly simplistic, 
at best.”40 
D.  The Doctor’s Role in Informed Consent 
Regulation of informed consent essentially controls the dissemi-
nation of knowledge.  Patients expect that medical counseling will 
help them make judgments that are scientifically accurate and inde-
pendent of external interference.41  They visit their doctors with the 
anticipation that if preference is given to some procedures, it stems 
from medicine alone, not the state’s political or ideological prefer-
ence.  This perspective promotes a patient-centered approach to 
medicine and facilitates treatment, protects the patient’s medical de-
cision making from governmental coercion, ensures that physicians 
fulfill professional standards according to their best judgment, and 
protects the integrity of medicine from the “potentially corrupting 
effects of a State agenda.”42 
Much like other professional fiduciary relationships, such as those 
between attorney and client, the physician-patient relationship is 
founded on trust.  “Candor is the hallmark of such a relationship be-
cause one cannot have trust and confidence that another is acting re-
sponsibly on one’s behalf without regular, candid disclosure of perti-
nent information.”43  And much like other professional relationships 
founded on trust, physician-patient discourse is protected through 
multiple legal frameworks.  In the law of evidence, for example, the 
physician-patient testimonial privilege reflects the idea that protect-
ing the integrity of physician-patient communication and preserving 
patients’ privacy trumps the discovery of potentially probative evi-
dence.44  This demonstrates the concern that without recognition of 
the importance of trust, relationships which are important for society 
to function might be negatively affected. 
 
 40 Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2190. 
 41 See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L. J. 151, 174 (1996) (arguing that the First 
Amendment prohibits viewpoint-based regulation of medical counseling because “pa-
tients expect the independent judgment of physicians to trump inconsistent managerial 
demands”). 
 42 Paula E. Berg, Lost in a Doctrinal Wasteland:  The Exceptionalism of Doctor-Patient Speech Within 
the Rehnquist Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 153, 173 (1998). 
 43 BEN A. RICH, STRANGE BEDFELLOWS:  HOW MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE HAS INFLUENCED 
MEDICAL ETHICS AND MEDICAL PRACTICE 50 (2001). 
 44 See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 759–
60 (6th ed. 2008).  Though the Federal Rules of Evidence do not recognize physician-
patient privilege, states may protect the communication with their own statutes.  Id. at 
818. 
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Studies of the relationship show that there is indeed a differential 
power dynamic between physicians and their patients.  One of the 
problems is the lack of a shared discourse;45 this can lead to a pa-
tient’s deference to her physician because of medical and scientific-
sounding language.  Despite a desire for information, patients are un-
likely to engage in many information-seeking behaviors when com-
municating with their physicians.46  It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
communication between the two tends to be dominated by the doc-
tor.47  Patients are also inclined to trust their doctors because their 
medical knowledge extends beyond that possessed by laypeople.48  As 
a result, a patient can give great weight to a physician’s statements, 
not necessarily because the message itself is persuasive but because 
the message comes from the trusted medical authority. 
Evidence like this demonstrates the absolute importance of truth-
ful, non-judgmental, non-misleading information on the part of the 
physician.  As such, “the physician has a duty to distance himself as 
much as possible from his personal preferences and values and to 
present information in a manner that reflects an objective assessment 
of the interests at stake for the patient.”49  The physician should not 
only create distance from his or her personal values but from the 
State’s values as well.50  This is the only way to avoid the danger of un-
 
 45 See ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE:  THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL 
CARE 109 (1970) (“[L]ay clients are by definition lacking in the educational or experien-
tial prerequisites that would allow them to decide, on grounds shared with the profes-
sional, whether to accept any particular piece of professional advice.”). 
 46 See, e.g., Analee Beisecker & Thomas Beisecker, Patient Information-Seeking Behaviors When 
Communicating with Doctors, 28 MED. CARE 19, 27 (1990) (“[E]ven though patients ex-
pressed a strong desire for medical information, they showed little communication behav-
ior designed to elicit this information.”); Richard Frankel, Talking in Interviews:  A Dispref-
erence for Patient-Initiated Questions in Physician-Patient Encounters, in INTERACTION 
COMPETENCE 231, 239 (George Psathas ed., 1990) (finding that patients initiated only 30 
of 3517 utterances during 10 medical interviews). 
 47 See Debra L. Roter et al., Communication Patterns of Primary Care Physicians, 277 JAMA 350, 
355 (1997) (reporting that 66% of physician visits studied were dominated by the physi-
cian, narrowly focused on biomedical concerns, and characterized by low levels of patient 
control over communication). 
 48 See J. Steven Svoboda et al., Informed Consent for Neonatal Circumcision:  An Ethical and Legal 
Conundrum, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 61, 71–72 (2000) (noting that patients’ 
understanding of medical procedures can often be limited more by a doctor’s inability to 
convey information than by the patients’ inherent inability to understand). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Conscience objector clauses, which allow medical providers to opt out of providing cer-
tain procedures and prescriptions to patients, present some similar ethical issues.  See in-
fra note 197 for a comparison of informed consent statutes with conscience objection 
clauses in medicine. 
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due influence and ensure that patients give the most informed con-
sent possible. 
E.  The State’s Ability to Regulate Physician Speech 
All of this is not to say that doctor-patient speech has a special 
immunity from regulation.  States may certainly use their police pow-
ers to protect the public’s health and safety.51  The government and 
medical associations take it upon themselves to regulate, in part, what 
doctors can and cannot say to their patients.52  For example, a doctor 
can and should be required to tell a patient the risks of a given surgi-
cal procedure but he or she cannot be required to advise treatment 
because of the belief that all those who listen to their doctors are bet-
ter people.  This is clearly ideological (if also far-fetched).  Further, 
the state cannot compel ideological speech with the understanding 
that a professional can simply disclaim the message after it is spoken.  
Though this qualification might mitigate the effect of the state’s mes-
sage on the listener, it “does not diminish the distortion of the speak-
er’s mental process, or autonomy in determining the content of his 
or her expression.”53 
The government’s goal in regulating doctors’ speech is to prevent 
the expression of opinions that are inconsistent with accepted stan-
dards of the medical profession and to ensure the integrity of the 
communication.  To the extent that such communication is impor-
tant for informed medical treatment, the state has leeway to ensure 
that physicians are practicing medicine within the profession’s stan-
dards.  The difficulty lies in drawing the line between what is accept-
able to require in the name of professional regulation and what goes 
too far into the realm of what must remain protected speech. 
 
 51 See Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926) (“[T]here is no right to practice medi-
cine which is not subordinate to the police power of the States . . . .”); Dent v. West Vir-
ginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (“The power of the State to provide for the general wel-
fare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, in its judgment, will 
secure or tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as 
well as of deception and fraud.”). 
 52 See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (“The power of 
government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever the practice of a profession 
entails speech.”).  See generally Randall P. Bezanson, Speaking Through Others’ Voices:  Au-
thorship, Originality, and Free Speech, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 983, 1053 (2003)(observing 
that as professional speech, physician communication is “rigorously confined by external, 
and usually governmentally supported, limitations”); Gregory D. Curfman et al., Physi-
cians and the First Amendment, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2484, 2484 (2008) (“Under their au-
thority to regulate the practice of medicine, states can legally set standards for communi-
cation between physicians and patients.”). 
 53 Berg, supra note 42, at 167–68. 
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Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Roe v. Wade placed considerable 
emphasis on respect for the physician’s role and his or her profes-
sional judgment.  In fact, Linda Greenhouse, former New York Times 
Supreme Court Correspondent, likened the decision to a “doctor’s 
bill of rights.”54  In many ways, it could be argued that Roe demon-
strated how the 1973 Court saw medicine as a “mythically independ-
ent, parallel realm to the state.”55  Yet through the years, emphasis on 
the doctor has slowly faded and regulation of this sphere of medicine 
has become increasingly stricter.  Greenhouse observed that “[w]hile 
in Roe physicians were all-knowing professionals whose judgment was 
not to be questioned, the doctors depicted in [Gonzales v.] Carhart [in 
2007] were so untrustworthy that the Court [had to] permit Congress 
to come between them and their hapless patients.”56  This change in 
perspective reflects a trend throughout the country of tighter restric-
tions on the practice of medicine, which in some states cross the fine 
line into physicians’ First Amendment rights. 
A big part of the problem is that no well developed doctrine exists 
to test for ideology-based regulations of physicians’ speech.  Robert 
Post argues that any such restrictions must, at a minimum, have a 
“substantial justification” in order to be constitutional.57  The chal-
lenge is to construct those regulations that advance patients’ receipt 
of truthful information while avoiding those that silence or compel 
speech for purposes outside the practice of medicine.  After all, the 
doctor’s duty to exercise independent judgment is rooted in the 
overriding concern for the patient’s best interests.  Though regula-
tion may infiltrate the relationship to some degree, the important in-
 
 54 Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Talks About Abortion:  The Implications of a Shifting 
Discourse, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41, 42 (2008).  Greenhouse cites to an amicus brief in 
which the Texas statute was labeled a “serious obstacle to good medical practice,” impos-
ing restrictions that “interfere with the physician-patient relationship and with the ability 
of physicians to practice medicine in accordance with the highest professional standards.” 
Id. at 48 (citing Brief of American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Appellants at 2, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-
14)). 
 55 Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of Medical Independence, 72 BROOK. 
L. REV. 147, 151 (2006).  Hunter argues that the authority given to the physicians in Roe 
was based on the assumption that “medicine constitutes a private realm apart from the 
state which can therefore function as a buffer between the individual and the state.”  Id. 
at 195. 
 56 Greenhouse, supra note 54, at 44.  See Part III.B.6 for further discussion on the Carhart 
opinion. 
 57 Post, supra note 41, at 175; see also Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional 
Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 772 (1999) 
(arguing that current First Amendment analysis lacks any coherent view of professional 
speech regulation). 
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formational role that the profession serves must not be overshad-
owed.  Physicians grant people “access to a realm of shared knowl-
edge that is neither state propaganda nor private fancy”58 and it is 
thus crucial that their First Amendment rights not be violated with 
forced ideological statements. 
III.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT STEPS INTO THE EXAMINING ROOM 
A.  Applying the First Amendment to the Practice of Medicine 
Doctor-patient discourse has a special place in First Amendment 
jurisprudence because of the uniqueness of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship in society and because of its role in “protecting and preserv-
ing personal liberty and the discovery of truth.”59  When a physician’s 
speech is regulated through a state’s viewpoint-based filter, it distorts 
patients’ decision making and trespasses on their constitutionally 
protected right to determine the destiny of their bodies.  The Su-
preme Court has consistently held that States cannot compel an indi-
vidual to adhere to an ideology or doctrinal orthodoxy.60  In Wooley v. 
Maynard, one of its seminal speech cases, the Court ruled that “the 
right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amend-
ment . . . includes both the right to speak freely and the right to re-
frain from speaking at all.”61  This is a crucial right, but it is much 
more difficult to apply a standard for it in the field of medicine than 
in the field of a public park. 
 
 58 Halberstam, supra note 57, at 773. 
 59 Berg, supra note 20, at 243.  But see Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists, 476 U.S. 747, 802–03 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“[N]othing in the Constitu-
tion indicates a preference for the liberty of doctors over that of lawyers, accountants, 
bakers, or brickmakers.”). 
 60 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“At the heart of the First 
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the 
ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. . . . Government 
action that . . . requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the Govern-
ment[] contravenes this essential right.”); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 
514–19 (1991) (outlining the standards by which a state may constitutionally require that 
public employees contribute fees to unions); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 
234–35 (1977) (“[I]n a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his 
conscience rather than coerced by the State.”); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that the government cannot require newspapers to run 
certain editorials); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or pet-
ty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters 
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”). 
 61 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 
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Those on the receiving end of the information are undoubtedly 
affected by these regulations but so too are the physicians who are 
compelled to deliver the message.  Justice Douglas wrote in 1961 that 
“[t]he right of the doctor to advise his patients according to his best 
lights seems so obviously within First Amendment rights as to need 
no extended discussion.”62  Yet extended discussion has occurred.63  
Perhaps back in 1961 Justice Douglas could not foresee the onslaught 
of abortion-related litigation that would come as a result of the dis-
agreement over the newly articulated right of privacy.  Even if he 
could have looked into the future, would he have been able to make 
sense of the Court’s rulings?  There has been inconsistency, or at the 
very least, a lack of clarity, over how the state can regulate physician 
speech in the context of informed consent to perform an abortion.64  
This is no doubt provoked in part by the polarized nature of the po-
litical debate and the argument over what exactly constitutes scien-
tific fact. 
The following discussion provides a roadmap of important cases 
that have shifted and shaped the landscape of physicians’ First 
Amendment rights.  I begin in 1977 with Wooley v. Maynard and end 
in 2007 with Carhart v. Gonzales.  In just over thirty years, the Supreme 
Court unmistakably tightened restraints on physicians and, in doing 
so, increased the state’s ability to script the practice of medicine. 
B.  Thirty Years of Cases:  Shifting and Shaping the Landscape 
1.  Initial Challenges 
“Live Free or Die.”  This New Hampshire motto, stamped for dec-
ades upon its state license plates, was embraced by many of its citizens 
for its promotion of state pride and individualism.  Others, however, 
protested the obligatory fixture as unwelcome ideological speech.  
Wooley v. Maynard 65 affirmed that all citizens had the right to avoid 
 
 62 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  “[T]he First Amend-
ment and other parts of the law erect a fence inside which men can talk.  The law-makers, 
legislators and officials stay on the outside of that fence.”  Id. at 514 (quoting ZECHARIAH 
CHAFEE, JR., THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 108 (1956)). 
 63 For an in-depth discussion about physician speech and abortion, see Berg, supra note 20 
(writing on how most courts use privacy rather than First Amendment grounds to strike 
down statutes that criminalize physician speech about contraception and abortion). 
 64 Christina E. Wells, for example, has argued that the Court has incorrectly treated abor-
tion counseling as “a form of activity rather than [as] a form of speech.”  Abortion Counsel-
ing as Vice Activity:  The Free Speech Implications of Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1724, 1725 (1995). 
 65 430 U.S. 705. 
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becoming conduits for a state’s message (via car or otherwise).  Chief 
Justice Burger wrote that “where the State’s interest is to disseminate 
an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot 
outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming 
the courier for such message.”66  Though not in the context of abor-
tion or even medicine, this articulation of individuals’ rights and of 
state limitations has served as a cornerstone of First Amendment ju-
risprudence.  It is interesting too that this decision came four years 
after Roe v. Wade was decided; even if this was not a response to the 
ruling or even imagined to be somehow related to abortion, Justice 
Burger’s sweeping enunciation of limits on the state could clearly be 
read in 1977 to apply to much more than license plates. 
Six years after Wooley came a case that directly addressed the con-
flict between mandated informed consent to abortion and the First 
Amendment:  City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health.67  In 
this case, the Supreme Court would have a chance to rule on the is-
sue directly.  The Akron ordinance in question compelled physicians, 
among other things, to tell patients seeking to terminate their preg-
nancies that “the unborn child is a human life from the moment of 
conception.”68  This requirement, remarkably similar in language to 
South Dakota’s script, essentially forced physicians to make state-
ments that personified fetuses. 
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit, which had 
invalidated the informed consent section of the Akron abortion ordi-
nance.69  The Court explained that the informed consent require-
ment was  “inconsistent with the Court’s holding in Roe v. Wade that a 
State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its regu-
lation of abortions.”70  Justice O’Connor, who dissented, still made 
sure to articulate that despite her disagreement with the majority’s 
opinion, “[it was] not to say that the informed consent provisions may 
not violate the First Amendment rights of the physician if the State 
requires him or her to communicate its ideology.”71  Thus, even 
 
 66 Id. at 717. 
 67 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 68 AKRON CODIFIED ORDINANCES 160-1978 § 1870.06, quoted in Akron, 462 U.S. at 423–24.  
One of the findings that led to the enactment of the statute was that “there is no point in 
time between . . . the blastocyst stage and the birth of the infant at which point we can say 
the unborn child is not a human life.”  Id., quoted in Akron, 462 U.S. at 421. 
 69 In addition to invalidating the informed consent provision, the Court held that the provi-
sions dealing with parental consent, a 24-hour waiting period, and the disposal of fetal 
remains were unconstitutional.  See Akron, 462 U.S. at 452. 
 70 Id. at 444 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159–62 (1973)). 
 71 Id. at 472 n.16 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
170 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
though ideological communication was not an issue raised by the par-
ties in this case, Justice O’Connor’s interpretation of the question was 
clear. 
As the Ohio federal district court ruled before Akron reached the 
Supreme Court, the state could constitutionally require abortion 
counseling but it could not go farther to “specify what each patient 
must be told.  That determination,” explained the lower court, “must 
be left to the individual counselor based upon the needs of the par-
ticular patient.  Otherwise, the physician is being placed in the ‘unde-
sired and uncomfortable straightjacket’ warned against by the Su-
preme Court.”72  When the case reached Washington, this aspect of 
the district court’s decision was affirmed; the Court saw it as an intru-
sion upon the discretion of physicians.73  But despite this victory for 
physicians (and patients), the relative freedom that the Akron deci-
sion gave doctors would not be long-lived. 
2.  Narrowing the Playing Field 
Just three years after Akron came Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists.74  This case invalidated a Pennsylvania 
informed consent statute which required that a pregnant woman be 
informed by her physician of detrimental physical and psychological 
effects and of the medical risks of abortion.75  The Supreme Court 
firmly stated that “[t]his type of compelled information is the antithe-
sis of informed consent.  That the Commonwealth does not, and 
surely would not, compel similar disclosure of every possible peril of 
necessary surgery or of simple vaccination, reveals the anti-abortion 
character of the statute and its real purpose.”76  By analyzing the stat-
ute in this way, the Court recognized that Pennsylvania’s motive fell 
outside the sphere of acceptable medical regulation.  No ideology per 
se was required to be conveyed, but the medical facts included were 
not deemed necessary to the true spirit of informed consent.  Even if 
true, listing every possible thing that could ever go wrong is simply 
not part of the doctrine.  This ruling was the same physician-friendly 
 
 72 Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1203 (N.D. Ohio 
1979) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 
(1976)). 
 73 Akron, 462 U.S. at 445. 
 74 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
 75 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 750. 
 76 Id. at 764.  The Court also noted that such compelled disclosure increases the patient’s 
anxiety and intrudes upon the physician’s exercise of proper professional judgment.  Id. 
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approach taken in Akron, but both cases would only control for a few 
more years. 
The 1991 Supreme Court decision in Rust v. Sullivan77 concerned 
the constitutionality of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices’ regulations on the use of federal funds spent to promote family 
planning through Title X of the Public Health Service Act.78  
Through this Act, Congress prohibited any of the federal govern-
ment’s funds from being used in programs in which abortion was a 
method of family planning.  From a First Amendment perspective, 
the issue was the constitutionality of the speech-related regulations in 
the Act, which prohibited doctors from talking to their patients about 
abortion as an option and from providing referrals to any woman 
who sought an abortion.79 
The Court held that these regulations did not violate the First 
Amendment but it explicitly declined to resolve the question of 
whether, in general, the traditional doctor-patient relationship 
should enjoy protection from government regulation under the First 
Amendment.80  The Court suggested that a viewpoint-based regula-
tion which censored the speech of publicly funded physicians would 
be unconstitutional if physicians were required to represent the gov-
ernment’s opinions as their own, or if their relationships with pa-
tients were such that an expectation of receiving complete medical 
advice was justified.81 
Title X’s requisite omission placed an unprecedented restriction 
on physician speech or, now, a lack thereof.  Yet the decision also left 
the door wide open for future litigation over government regulation 
of speech activities.82 
 
 77 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 78 42 U.S.C. §§ 300–300a-6 (2006). 
 79 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1997).  If a woman requested a referral, the regulations recom-
mended the pre-scripted response that “the project does not consider abortion an ap-
propriate method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for abor-
tion.”  Id. 
 80 Rust, 500 U.S. at 200. 
 81 Id. 
 82 For example, in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), the Court held that 
Congress had violated the First Amendment when it forbade lawyers working for the Le-
gal Services Corporation from challenging the constitutionality or statutory validity of 
welfare laws.  Id. at 548–49.  This holding is in conflict with Rust.  The Rust Court stated 
that unconstitutional conditions only arise if there is a condition on the recipient of a 
government subsidy which prevents the recipient from engaging in conduct outside the 
scope of the program; it is not unconstitutional when the condition is on the program it-
self.  Rust, 500 U.S. at 197.  Velazquez departed from this First Amendment precedent in 
ruling that the government, in regulating professional speech, cannot prohibit (or pre-
sumably require) speech which is inconsistent with an established and legitimate under-
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3.  Casey Comes to Bat 
And then there came Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey.83  In the history of abortion regulation, one could say 
that there is B.C.—Before Casey—and After.  The effects of the deci-
sion on this field of law have been significant.  The case dealt with a 
Pennsylvania informed consent to abortion statute and, though 
widely known for its rejection of Roe’s trimester framework and re-
placement with an “undue burden” standard, it also addressed, if only 
briefly, physicians’ First Amendment rights.  Under the Casey plural-
ity, viewpoint-based regulations of doctor-patient speech were unrea-
sonable if physicians were compelled to make statements that were 
false or misleading.84 
The health care provider petitioners in Casey challenged the 
Pennsylvania law as violating the First Amendment, arguing that it 
compelled them to act as mouthpieces for the State in discouraging 
abortion.85  They relied heavily on Wooley, which at the time seemed a 
logical thing to do, given the precedent in the Court’s First Amend-
ment jurisprudence.  Their argument was that the statute directly re-
gulated physicians’ speech for the purpose of influencing patients to 
make decisions that conformed to the state’s ideology and that this 
was a clear violation of the Constitution.86 
The State grounded its defense of the statute in First Amendment 
principles by arguing that the law was a permissible regulation of 
commercial speech.87  Regulation of commercial speech must be “no[] 
more extensive than . . . necessary” to serve a substantial government 
interest.88  But speech in the medical realm had never been held to 
the same standards as speech in the commercial sphere; this was a 
line of reasoning that was ungrounded in precedent.  The strange-
 
standing of a profession.  Just as lawyers cannot be restricted from making the best legal 
arguments available for their clients, doctors cannot be restricted to communicating ideas 
that are not medically established. 
 83 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 84 Id. at 882. 
 85 See Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 53–55, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 
91-744, 91-902). 
 86 Id. 
 87 See Brief for Respondents at 70–71, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902).  The 
Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as “speech which does ‘no more than 
propose a commercial transaction.’”  Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 
 88 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 569–70 
(1980). 
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ness of the State’s commercial speech argument was not lost on the 
Justices.  At oral argument they questioned whether a physician’s dis-
pensing of professional advice was commercial in nature and seemed 
skeptical of arguments on behalf of the State that said this speech 
could be described as such.89  Despite attention paid to the commer-
cial speech issue during oral argument, the Court failed to address 
this specific issue in the written opinion. 
In fact, the attention the Court gave to the First Amendment ar-
gument as a whole was fairly fleeting.  With regard to the physician’s 
asserted right not to provide certain information in the manner 
mandated by the State, the opinion stated: 
To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are im-
plicated, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), but only as part of 
the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation 
by the State, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977).  We see no con-
stitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the in-
formation mandated by the State here.90 
Through this short section, the Justices grounded the power of gov-
ernment to impose viewpoint regulations on doctor-patient speech in 
the State’s police power to license and regulate physicians.91  The 
Court seemed to look at the conflict as one involving simply two par-
ties’ rights:  the physician’s right to speak and the State’s right to re-
gulate.  Totally ignored, however, was a third party’s interest:  the pa-
tient’s right to receive objective medical information. 
The Court made reference to Wooley, but ultimately the decision 
rested upon the legislature’s discretion to regulate general activity in 
the business and professional contexts.92  Herein lies the inherent 
 
 89 The Justices questioned counsel for respondents as follows: 
Question:  . . . When the doctor is giving professional advice to the patient, you 
think that is commercial? 
Mr. Preate:  That is commercial.  The petitioners already do that right now.  They 
already tell their patients, the physicians and the counselors that there are medical 
risks associated with this procedure. 
Question:  I wouldn’t have thought that was commercial speech.  What do you rely 
on? 
Mr. Preate:  In Zauderer. 
Question:  But that is advertising, that is different. 
  Transcript of Oral Argument at 37–38, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (Nos. 91-744, 91-902). 
 90 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. 
 91 Paula Berg observed that “[w]hile the Court tipped its hat to the idea that the challenged 
regulations implicated physicians’ speech rights, it summarily dismissed this concern, stat-
ing that advising patients is merely a ‘part of the practice of medicine, subject to reason-
able licensing and regulation by the State.’”  Berg, supra note 42, at 158 (quoting Casey, 
505 U.S. at 884). 
 92 See, for example, Wells, supra note 64, at 1738–39, observing that the Casey Court cited 
the professional regulation cases of Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) (holding that 
it was a reasonable exercise of New York’s police powers to enact a statute which required 
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tension:  though the state may generally not compel individuals to 
adhere to any doctrine or engage in prescribed speech, “when that 
same individual assumes a professional or other work role, Casey sug-
gests that reasonable regulation may diminish or eliminate this right 
not to be required to endorse—by words or silence—prescribed 
speech.”93  Speech restrictions regulated solely as “part of the practice 
of medicine” place them in the context of a world that most people 
assume is characterized by scientific facts.  Even in medicine, how-
ever, there are fuzzy lines between facts and ideas.  This can therefore 
present a conflict for regulation of speech. 
4.  Truthful and Nonmisleading Information 
Casey did not give the state an absolute power to dictate the content 
of physicians’ statements to patients.  New standards were set though, 
and in reconfiguring the criteria, the Supreme Court overruled por-
tions of Akron and Thornburgh.  “To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh 
find a constitutional violation when the government requires, as it 
does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading informa-
tion . . . those cases go too far [and] are inconsistent with Roe’s ac-
knowledgment of an important interest in potential life,” stated the 
plurality.94  In other words, regulations were unconstitutional if they 
required physicians to make false or misleading statements to their 
patients. 
The critical aspect of this section of the decision is that though 
the Court overruled the two cases, its decision only narrowly applied 
to the extent that information delivered remains truthful and non-misleading.  
As such, the section of Akron that addressed use of the term “human 
life,” held to be unconstitutional, may not have been intended to be 
overruled in Casey.  Even in her Akron dissent, Justice O’Connor 
stated that informed consent provisions may violate physicians’ First 
Amendment rights if they are required to communicate “[the State’s] 
ideology.”95  The reason I believe we saw none of this reasoning from 
 
certain information about potentially harmful drugs to be filed with a state agency) and 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486–91 (1955) (holding that vari-
ous regulations of optometrists were consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment) as basis for its decision. 
 93 Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey:  Structuring the Woman’s Decisionmaking Process, 4 WM. 
& MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 787, 853 (1996). 
 94 Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.  The Court approved that information could be given about “the 
nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the 
‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus.”  Id. 
 95 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 472 n.16 (1983) (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting). 
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Justice O’Connor in Casey is that the Court interpreted the Pennsyl-
vania statute as addressing only truthful, non-misleading facts; Justice 
O’Connor’s concern in Akron about the forced communication of 
ideology was not implicated in the Casey decision.96  The difference 
between these two decisions is crucial because it shows that Casey was 
not overruling the Court’s previous decisions in whole; the parts of 
Akron and Thornburgh that addressed ideology and even personhood 
were still good law. 
The Court did not expand on its statement to articulate what sort 
of information might fall outside of the “truthful [and] nonmislead-
ing” boundaries, perhaps because this categorization is intrinsically 
difficult.  For example, viewpoints in the medical community are usu-
ally sanctioned as false when measured against the “knowl-
edge . . . ordinarily possessed and exercised by physicians in good 
standing.”97  But there are some issues over which even physicians in 
good standing strongly disagree.98  To just classify something as true 
or false is not enough.99  This, presumably, is why the Court required 
that statements be not only truthful but also not misleading.  “Mis-
leading” can certainly be taken in many ways, but statements that ca-
pitalize on a patient’s fear, cite as fact that which is disputed in the 
medical community, and present the State’s ideology as science can, I 
argue, comfortably fall under this broad heading. 
5.  Criticism of Casey and Later Interpretations 
Justices Stevens and Blackmun strongly dissented from the ruling 
in Casey that government could impose such restrictions on physi-
cians’ speech.  Justice Stevens expressed concern that compelling 
persuasive speech by physicians may be unduly influential in light of 
the fact that many patients have a heightened vulnerability when 
 
 96 See Appellees’ Brief at 18, Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 
(8th Cir. 2008) (No. 05-3093) (“Because Casey addressed truthful, non-misleading factual 
statements, Justice O’Connor’s concern in Akron I with respect to forced communication 
of ideology was not implicated in Casey.”).  Notable, too, is that Justice O’Connor cited 
Wooley in her Akron reasoning regarding the unconstitutionality of forcing ideological 
speech.  Akron, 462 U.S. at 472 n.16 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 97 Larsen v. Yelle, 246 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Minn. 1976). 
 98 See infra Part IV.D (addressing the lack of scientific consensus over when life begins). 
 99 This limited inquiry “would not prevent government from forcing physicians to make 
statements that are plainly intended to capitalize on patients’ fear and vulnerability within 
the structure of the doctor-patient relationship.”  Berg, supra note 20, at 224. 
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faced with important medical decisions and procedures.100  He also 
expressed a desire to remain true to the still very recent holdings of 
Akron and Thornburgh.101 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent expressed sentiments similar to Justice 
Stevens’s, warning of the danger of indoctrination when a govern-
ment is permitted to compel physicians to express ideological mes-
sages to patients.102  He argued that the plurality authorized the sub-
stitution of “state medicine” for dialogue driven by patients’ needs 
and interests.103  This warning was an astute one.  In opening the door 
to broader state regulation of physician speech, the Court was also es-
sentially welcoming regulation that placed the state’s interests before 
those of the patient. 
Casey left courts in a curious wake; despite the guidance it offered 
on the application of the First Amendment, the ruling was still open 
enough to allow for various interpretations.104  Eubanks v. Schmidt105 of-
fered one such opportunity.  There, the Kentucky federal district 
court wrote that “[t]he Supreme Court has consistently invalidated 
schemes which compel ideological speech.  Presumably, had Justice 
O’Connor thought that the state sponsored materials in Casey were 
 
100 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 916 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“Decisional autonomy must limit the State’s power to in-
ject into a woman’s most personal deliberations its own views of what is best.”). 
101 Id. at 917. 
102 Id. at 935–36 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part).  Justice Blackmun also expressed frustration that the plurality opinion 
overruled what had so recently been held constitutional in Thornburgh, stating that that 
case “invalidated biased patient-counseling requirements virtually identical to the one at 
issue here.  What we said of those requirements fully applies in these cases.”  Id. 
103 Id. (citing Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763 
(1986)). 
104 Many scholars have criticized Casey, and Rust as well, as being inconsistent with the 
Court’s traditional First Amendment jurisprudence; they contend that the importance of 
physicians’ free speech was substantially underestimated by the decision.  See Janet Ben-
shoof, The Chastity Act:  Government Manipulation of Abortion Information and the First 
Amendment, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1916, 1931–33 (1988) (arguing that biased, government-
sponsored presentations of one side of pregnancy options violate the First Amendment); 
Berg, supra note 20, at 219 (observing that in the doctor-patient speech context, the 
Rehnquist Court has mysteriously not stuck to the First Amendment principle that speech 
regulations may not favor certain viewpoints over others); Wells, supra note 64, at 1744–
51 (discussing how the Court has strayed from traditional First Amendment analysis in 
the Rust and Casey decisions); Michael Fitzpatrick, Note, Rust Corrodes:  The First Amend-
ment Implications of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 STAN. L. REV. 185, 200–01 (1992) (explaining how 
Rust is an outlier opinion that does not comport with the Supreme Court’s general intol-
erance of viewpoint-based restrictions). 
105 126 F. Supp. 2d 451 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (upholding Kentucky’s informed consent to abor-
tion statute). 
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an ideological statement, she would have said so.”106  The court ob-
served that instead of expressing this view, Justice O’Connor only 
classified the Pennsylvania pamphlets as “little more than the re-
quirement that the physician provide certain medical facts and agen-
cy information to patients as part of a comprehensive medical regula-
tory scheme.”107  This interpretation of Casey is consistent with the 
idea that though the state can regulate some aspects of physician 
speech, it may not regulate ideology. 
6.  Carhart’s Marginalization of Roe and Invitation to States 
No case has yet come to the Supreme Court that has directly chal-
lenged this issue or caused the Justices to articulate a clearer standard 
for physician speech.  Even in Gonzales v. Carhart,108 one of the latest 
abortion decisions to come to the Court, the question of First 
Amendment rights as related to ideology was not directly raised any-
where in the opinion.109  But the case still managed to bring the issue 
of informed consent to the forefront of the abortion debate.  In it, 
the Supreme Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 
2003 and ruled that the Act did not impose an undue burden on the 
due process right of a woman to obtain an abortion.110  Applying the 
reasoning put forth in Casey, the Court stated that the Government 
had a legitimate, substantial interest in preserving and promoting fe-
tal life.111  More so than in any of its earlier abortion decisions, the 
Court seemed to set up the relationship between physician and pa-
tient as one characterized by inherent tension.  Why, it seemed to ask, 
were physicians withholding information from women?  The critical 
question that lingered under the surface was this:  what could states 
do to make sure these women were informed? 
The First Amendment was not addressed in the text of the Carhart 
decision but this hardly means that the case did not and will not have 
a profound impact on physician speech rights.  Justice Kennedy’s 
 
106 Id. at 458 (citations omitted).  The court also noted that Casey contained no further dis-
cussion of whether the compelled speech at issue in Pennsylvania was ideological.  Id. 
107 Id. 
108 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007). 
109 The dissent in Rounds likewise noted that Carhart did not make any dramatic changes in 
the state of abortion regulations and the First Amendment, explaining that although “a 
state may use its own voice to ‘show its profound respect’ for fetal life, nowhere did the 
Supreme Court authorize a state to commandeer the voice of a physician to disseminate 
its ideological message.”  Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 
743 (8th Cir. 2008) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citing Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157). 
110 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 147. 
111 Id. at 145. 
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opinion, replete with multiple references to the infant life, was seen 
by many as an invitation to states to rethink their informed consent 
policies.112  Legislation has since been introduced in this post-Carhart 
era that is threatening a physician’s ability to convey non-political, 
non-ideological information to patients.113  After all, “if Congress 
[through the Partial-Birth Abortion Act] can make it a crime for doc-
tors to perform a medically accepted procedure,” warned Linda 
Greenhouse, “states can expect increased leeway for conscripting 
doctors as agents for conveying an official anti-abortion message.”114  
This is the present danger and the latest trend in challenges to the 
underlying premises of Roe. 
7. A Void in the Doctrine 
Reflecting on the Supreme Court’s history with respect to applica-
tion of the First Amendment to physician speech is critical to under-
standing how the Court might deal with physician speech issues in 
the future.  Casey set a standard that has encouraged states to create 
more detailed informed consent statutes, Carhart framed the poten-
tial conflict as one between women and their doctors, and some states 
are now starting to stretch the boundaries of what has been deemed 
constitutional.115  With the practice of medicine increasingly regu-
lated by the state, more defined lines are clearly needed between 
what is truly factual and nonmisleading and what is state ideology.  I 
turn now to examining where this line can be drawn. 
IV.  THE IDEOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE OF DEFINING WHEN LIFE BEGINS 
“Human being” is a socially ascriptive term for an entity that many 
would argue only has the potential to be a human life.  Deciding when 
a “human being” comes into existence is subjective.  For those who 
believe there is a “human being” present from the moment of con-
ception, abortion is unlikely to ever be anything less than murder.116  
 
112 See, e.g., Gold & Nash, supra note 16 (discussing the Carhart Court’s emphasis on in-
formed consent and its effect on the abortion debate in the states). 
113 See infra, Part VI. 
114 Greenhouse, supra note 54, at 57–58. 
115 See infra, Part VI. 
116 Margaret Olivia Little, The Moral Permissibility of Abortion, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN 
APPLIED ETHICS 27–28 (Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher Heath Wellman eds., 2005) 
(“The fetus, it’s claimed, is a person—not just a life (a frog is a life), or an organism worthy 
of special regard, but a creature of full moral status imbued with fundamental rights.  
Abortion, in turn, constitutes a gross violation of one of that person’s central-most such 
rights:  namely, its right to life.”). 
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But, as I will argue, such a belief is just that—belief and not fact, ide-
ology and not science. 
In attempting to decide when “human beings” begin, the prob-
lems that arise suggest that no position can rely on science alone to 
be either proved or disproved.  There is no consensus in religious 
doctrine either; just as Americans differ on this issue, so too do or-
ganized religions.117  Even if there was agreement, the First Amend-
ment’s Establishment Clause118 would prohibit any attempt to refash-
ion such a belief into law.119 
The way one approaches the question of the origin of life is inevi-
tably a function of “one’s way of looking at reality, one’s moral policy, 
the values and rights one believes need balancing, and the type of 
questions one thinks need to be asked.”120  In this Section, by looking 
at philosophical, legal, and scientific approaches to when life begins, 
I will argue that there is ultimately no scientific consensus and, as 
such, any statement which claims to definitively classify a fetus as a 
human being is based on ideology and not fact. 
A.  To ‘Being’ or Not to ‘Being’:  The Central Dispute 
In her seminal article, A Defense of Abortion, philosopher Judith Jar-
vis Thompson wrote that most of the opposition to abortion rests 
firmly on the premise that “the fetus is a human being, a person, 
from the moment of conception.”121  This places the question of hu-
man embryo status at the center of the abortion debate.122  Though 
 
117 For an in-depth look at different religions’ approaches to both abortion and contracep-
tion, see DANIEL C. MAGUIRE, SACRED CHOICES:  THE RIGHT TO CONTRACEPTION AND 
ABORTION IN TEN WORLD RELIGIONS (2001); see also Paul D. Simmons, Personhood, the Bi-
ble, and the Abortion Debate, EDUC. SERIES NO. 3 (Religious Coal. for Reprod. Choice, D.C.), 
1987, at 1. 
118 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion . . . .”) (applied to the states through U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1). 
119 See Simmons, supra note 117, at 10 (explaining that definitions of the fetus as a person 
under the Constitution are based on religious understanding and not public policy); see 
also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 932 (1992) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) (noting that the state’s interest in protecting fetal life is not grounded in the 
Constitution and that, consistent with the Establishment Clause, it also cannot it be a 
theological or sectarian interest). 
120 Daniel Callahan, Abortion Decisions:  Personal Morality, in ABORTION:  LAW, CHOICE AND 
MORALITY 493 (1970). 
121 Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 47 (1971); see also 
Norman C. Gillespie, Abortion and Human Rights, 87 ETHICS 237, 237 (1977). 
122 In one of the main texts in the field of bioethics, Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Chil-
dress explain that “[h]uman embryos and fetuses are often the centerpiece of [moral sta-
tus] discussion because they are developing individuals with the potential for, without yet 
having acquired, cognitive properties, moral agency, and social relationships. . . . [T]he 
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written before Roe made its journey from Texas to the nation’s high-
est court, Thompson’s premise was then and is still now the issue 
around which so much conflict arises. 
The primary argument against abortion relies on two premises 
that lead to a single conclusion:  it is wrong to kill an innocent hu-
man being, a human fetus is an innocent human being, therefore it is 
wrong to kill a human fetus.123  The central dispute hinges on the 
second premise:  whether or not the fetus is a human being.  If “hu-
man being” is interpreted as the equivalent of “person,” then the sec-
ond premise of the argument is clearly false because there is no plau-
sible argument that a fetus is either rational or self-conscious, as 
persons are.124  This argument is evidence that the fight over the term 
“human being” is not just a quarrel over semantics; it is the critical 
element to the dispute over when life begins. 
B.  What is a “Human Being”? 
The problem with the term “human being” is that it seems to pur-
posely play on that ambiguity which is pivotal to the entire abortion 
controversy.125  As the members of the Rounds dissent observed, when 
you place the term “human being” in the context of abortion, “[it] 
has an overwhelmingly subjective, normative meaning, in some sense 
encompassing the whole philosophical debate.”126  This calls into 
question whether a term that has a meaning in one context may be 
fairly used for a different purpose in another.   
Robert Post, in criticizing South Dakota’s statutory definition of 
“human being” as a “biological entity that belongs to the species Ho-
mo sapiens,” asserted that “it is not at all obvious that the fetus is a 
‘human being’ in a second and distinct sense, which is whether the 
fetus is a member of the community of human persons whose life 
possesses dignity and warrants respect.”127  This second sense of the 
 
idea is that it is morally wrong to intentionally cause a being with the potential to develop 
status-conferring properties to lose or fail to realize that potential.”  PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 83 (6th ed. 2009).  Key to this articulation of the debate is the term 
“potential” to describe the properties of the fetus. 
123 PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 138 (2d ed. 1993). 
124 Post, supra note 3, at 955 n.83 (explaining Peter Singer’s philosophical argument in Abor-
tion, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 1–2 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995)). 
125 See Post, supra note 3, at 955 n.83. 
126 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 742 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(Murphy, J., dissenting). 
127 Post, supra note 3, at 954–55.  But see Singer, supra note 123, at 150 (“[W]hether a being is 
or is not a member of our species is, in itself no more relevant to the wrongness of killing 
it than whether it is or is not a member of our race.  The belief that mere membership of 
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term, he argues, is the critical one when it comes to the context of 
abortion.128 
A “human being” or “human” is commonly understood in the 
United States to mean “person” and vice versa, as is apparent by dic-
tionary definitions that present the two as almost interchangeable.129  
When these terms are used to define one another as essential equiva-
lents, a State’s attempt to redefine one of them in different, scientific 
terms looks contrived and, at the very least, linguistically question-
able.  More importantly, to a patient, who is expected to have only a 
layman’s understanding of scientific terminology, the word “human 
being” is one that is essentially interchangeable with “person.”  Use of 
the term is not automatically justified simply because a complicated 
definition for the phrase is buried within the statutory definitions sec-
tion of a law.  Mandated communication of the words in this sense is 
misleading and this is a violation of the standard for informed con-
sent set forth in Casey.130 
C.  How the Law Has Approached the Question of When Life Begins 
For the courts, the question of when life begins has largely been 
centered around the question of whether the fetus can be viewed as a 
person for purposes of constitutional protection.  “The suggestion 
that states are free to declare a fetus a person . . . . assumes that a 
state can curtail some persons’ constitutional rights by adding new 
persons to the constitutional population.”131  Such a declaration 
would also pose problems in trying to apply constitutional rights to 
intrauterine entities. 
 
our species, irrespective of other characteristics, makes a great difference to the wrong-
ness of killing a being is a legacy of religious doctrines . . . .”). 
128 Post, supra note 3, at 954–55. 
129 See, e.g., RANDOM HOUSE COMPACT UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 931, 1445 (Special 2d ed. 
1996) (defining “human being” as “a person, esp. as distinguished from other animals or 
as representing the human species” and a “person” as “a human being, whether man, 
woman, or child”). 
130 See Appellees’ Brief at 35–36, Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (No. 05-3093) (“Reasonable patient 
understanding informs whether mandated informed consent language is misleading, and 
reasonable patient understanding confirms, at minimum, that the subject language here 
is misleading.”). 
131 Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights:  Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 381, 400–01 (1992) (explaining that one citizen’s constitutional rights are af-
fected by who else has such rights “because the rights of others may compete or conflict 
with his.  So any power to increase the constitutional population by unilateral decision 
would be, in effect, a power to decrease rights the national Constitution grants to oth-
ers”). 
182 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
Roe v. Wade, though undoubtedly most renowned for what it did 
do (hold that abortion was within the scope of the personal liberty 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment),132 is also crucial for what it refused to do—specifically, classify 
when life begins.133  “When those trained in the respective disciplines 
of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any 
consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s 
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer,”134 stated 
Justice Blackmun.  Though many have tried to argue that we have 
come to the point at which the answer is attainable, there is still no 
general consensus or federal judicial ruling on the question.135 
Even the Casey decision did not pretend to judge when life might 
begin.  The language in the Pennsylvania statute did not directly ad-
dress this issue,136 but the court still made sure to clarify that what it 
had said about the question in Roe still rang true almost twenty years 
later.  Justice Kennedy wrote that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right 
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life.”137  On this particular issue, 
Roe still stands strong in its refusal to let the State create its own defi-
nition.138  This point, though certainly not the bedrock of the Casey 
decision, is crucial to the interpretation of later statutes that purport 
to align with the one at issue in Casey.  Justice Stevens’ concurrence in 
Casey further emphasized that the Court had never ruled that a de-
 
132 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
133 Id. at 159 (“We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.”) 
134 Id.  There was, notably, no dissent from this part of the holding.  See id. at 173. 
135 See, e.g., Appellees’ Brief at 7, Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (No. 05-3093) (observing that even 
though courts have received arguments from both sides of the debate, no federal court 
has “altered or retreated from [Roe’s] finding of the state of man’s knowledge on the 
question of when human life begins”). 
136 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-87 (1992) (citing 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. 3205 (Supp. 1995) (Pennsylvania’s informed consent requirement)). 
137 Id. at 851 (1992).  Even though this was in reference to the Fourteenth Amendment, it is 
still telling for First Amendment rights since it is further proof that in the plurality’s view, 
the question of defining when life begins was not at issue in Casey. 
138 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 41–43, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (Nos. 91-744, 91-902).  The 
Justices began with a “basic question,” asking Kenneth Starr, of the U.S. Department of 
Justice, about the Department’s position “on the question whether a fetus is a person 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment?”  Id. at 41–42.  Starr started to reply 
that the Department “[did] not have a position on that question and this Court has not 
addressed, or at least there is no Justice at this Court” but was interrupted and told that 
“[i]t’s addressed in Roe.”  Id. at 42.  To this, Starr admitted “[t]hat, that, that is correct.  
And it does seem to me that ultimately that is an extraordinarily difficult question which 
this Court need not address, and it need not address it in this case.”  Id.  This excerpt of 
the transcript illustrates that the question of when life begins was not up for debate in the 
Court that morning. 
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veloping fetus is a person under the Constitution; “indeed,” he wrote, 
“no Member of the Court has ever questioned this fundamental 
proposition.”139 
One final point is that the language the Court has used in refer-
ence to the developing fetus has been neutral.  In both Casey and fif-
teen years later in Carhart, the Court repeatedly referred to the state’s 
“interest in potential life” when speaking of the fetus or embryo and 
avoided describing it as an existing human being.140  Though there 
are certainly conflicting opinions about a great deal in abortion juris-
prudence, this much is clear:  the judiciary refuses to define when life 
begins and the fact that it has never once referred to the fetus as a 
“human being” is evidence of this commitment. 
D.  How Science Has Approached the Question of When Life Begins 
Law refuses to define when human life begins.  Science tries to 
reach a definition but is unable to answer the arguably impossible 
question.141  Does a “human being” come into existence at concep-
tion?142  At some point before birth?  Or at birth itself?  The question 
 
139 Casey, 505 U.S. at 913 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  As if to clar-
ify for those States that would, in the future, attempt to create more restricting informed 
consent statutes, Justice Stevens was explicit in his emphasis that “as a matter of federal 
constitutional law, a developing organism that is not yet a ‘person’ does not have what is 
sometimes described as a ‘right to life.’  This has been and, by the Court’s holding today, 
remains a fundamental premise of our constitutional law governing reproductive auton-
omy.” Id. at 913–14 (footnote omitted).  Justice Scalia too, even in expressing dissatisfac-
tion with the Roe opinion, acknowledged that there is no way to determine whether “the 
human fetus is in some critical sense merely potentially human . . . as a legal matter; it is 
in fact a value judgment.” Id. at 982 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).  A narrow reading of 
Roe though could make it seem that the Court refused to let states define when life begins 
only for the purposes of criminal law.  It could be argued by opponents that the Court 
did not rule on whether the state is still allowed to define when life begins for other pur-
poses such as, in this case, advocacy. 
140 Id. at 875–76 (plurality opinion); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (referenc-
ing “the State’s interest in potential life”). 
141 Some scholars argue that stages of development are crucial to the distinction of when life 
begins.  See Michael J. Sandel, Perspective, Embryo Ethics—The Moral Logic of Stem-Cell Re-
search, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 207, 208 (2004) (“[A]lthough every oak tree was once an 
acorn, it does not follow that acorns are oak trees, or that I should treat the loss of an 
acorn eaten by a squirrel in my front yard as the same kind of loss as the death of an oak 
tree felled by a storm.”).  But see Robert P. George & Patrick Lee, Acorns and Embryos, THE 
NEW ATLANTIS, Fall 2004/Winter 2005, at 90 (arguing that “[e]ach of us developed by a 
gradual, unified, and self-directed process . . . into adulthood, with his or her determi-
nateness, unity, and identity fully intact”). 
142 Paul Copland and Grant Gillett delve into this question and argue that calling the ge-
nome of a species a human being is going too far, The Bioethical Structure of a Human Being, 
20 J. OF APPLIED PHIL. 123 (2003) (supporting a gradualist position on the structure of a 
human being, whereby the embryo takes on the form and ethical significance of a human 
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is no more easily answered today than it was in 1973 when the Court 
decided Roe.  Though technology and biological knowledge have 
both advanced, science is still unable to pinpoint the moment at 
which a “human being” comes into existence.143 
Scientists, such as a large number of those who filed amicus briefs 
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, concede that the only true sci-
entific consensus to be reached is that science alone cannot answer 
this question.144  Instead, individuals need to look to their own values 
and beliefs.  “Individual scientists,” they acknowledge, “will have indi-
vidual answers . . . . These answers do not represent any ‘scientific’ 
truth, because they are based upon values and beliefs, not upon sci-
ence alone.”145  Yet included in the opposing party’s amici briefs are 
the claims that “[m]edical and scientific data establish the fact that 
the preborn child is a human being”146 and that “those trained in 
medicine and biology do not disagree on when human life begins 
when one uses only objective criteria to determine the beginnings of 
human life.”147  Even more recently, appellants in Rounds asserted, as 
if to prove their point, that “[p]laintiffs produced no scientific evi-
dence that an unborn child who is to be aborted is not a ‘human be-
ing.’”148  Never do they acknowledge that perhaps the reason such 
evidence was not presented was because it could not be presented; it 
does not fall within the realm of scientific proof. 
 
being progressively).  “[I]t is wrong to assume,” they state, “that the genome of a species 
defines the kernel or essence of a species in terms of its wider properties and to reduce 
the identity concerned to genetic identity.”  Id. at 128. 
143 See, e.g., Brief of 167 Distinguished Scientists and Physicians, Including 11 Nobel Laure-
ates, as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 6, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 
U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605) (“[T]he question of when a human life truly begins calls for 
a conclusion as to which characteristics define the essence of human life.  While science 
can tell us when certain biological attributes can be detected, science cannot tell us which 
biological attributes establish the existence of a human being.”). 
144 Id. at 2 (“There is no scientific consensus that a human life begins at conception, at a giv-
en stage in fetal development, or at birth.  The question of ‘when a human life begins’ 
cannot be answered by reference to scientific principles . . . . The answer to that question 
will depend on each individual’s social, religious, philosophical, ethical and moral beliefs 
and values.”). 
145 Id. at 4. 
146 Brief for the Southwest Life and Law Center, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appel-
lants at 6, Webster , 492 U.S. 490 (No. 88-605). 
147 Brief for Larry Joyce as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 30, Webster, 492 U.S. 490 
(No. 88-605). 
148 Appellants’ Brief at 16, Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 
(8th Cir. 2008) (No. 05-3093) (emphasis added).  The state’s physician witness also made 
the bold assertion that “[t]he statement that the fetus or embryo is a ‘whole, separate, 
unique, living human being’ is generally accepted in the medical community as accu-
rate.”  See Appellees’ Brief at 11, Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (No. 05-3093). 
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This question of scientific proof hinges the debate.  In hearings 
before the Senate on the Human Life Bill, Dr. Leon Rosenberg ex-
plained that the scientific method just does not lend itself to the job 
of classifying when life begins.149  The scientific method depends on 
having both an idea and a means of testing that idea; a method for 
experimentation.  Dr. Rosenberg maintained that “concepts such as 
humanness are beyond the purview of science because no idea about 
them can be tested experimentally.”150  The Supreme Court has come 
to the similar conclusion that in order to classify something as scien-
tific knowledge, it must be based on a scientifically valid process or 
theory.151  “General acceptance” by the scientific community and 
whether or not the hypothesis can be tested can also influence 
whether evidence is admissible as scientific fact.152 
Just as there is no consensus as to when life begins, there is also no 
scientific consensus for the term “human being.”153  Professor Paul 
Wolpe, then President of the American Society for Bioethics and 
Humanities, testified in Rounds that “it is not a statement of scientific 
or medical fact to designate the embryo or fetus as a ‘whole, separate, 
 
149 See Leon Rosenberg on the “Human Life” Bill, SCIENCE, May 22, 1981, at 907.  Dr. Leon Ro-
senberg, Chairman of the Department of Human Genetics at Yale University Medical 
School, offered this testimony on the Human Life Bill in 1981 before the Subcommittee 
on the Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee.  See Constance Holden, 
Senate Commences Hearings on “Human Life,” SCIENCE, May 8, 1981, at 648–49; see also Leon 
E. Rosenberg, Clinical Implications, SOCIETY, May/June 1982, at 60 (“Scientists have been 
able to determine . . . that the earth is round or that genes are composed of DNA be-
cause, and only because, experiments could be performed to test these ideas. Without 
experiments there is no science, no way to prove or disprove any idea.”). 
150 Leon Rosenberg on the “Human Life” Bill, supra note 149, at 907. 
151 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (“‘Scientific methodology to-
day is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; in-
deed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human in-
quiry.’”) (quoting ERIC D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 645 (1983)).  The Court pointed to four non-exclusive factors to 
be considered:  (1) whether the hypothesis had been tested, (2) whether the theory had 
been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) whether there had been testing to 
show the rate of error, and (4) whether the theory was generally accepted in the scientific 
community.  Id. at 593–94. 
152 Id. 
153 A search of multiple medical dictionaries turned up no entries for the term “human be-
ing,”  See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 380 (1995); 
DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 779 (27th ed. 1988).  The Online medical 
dictionary similarly has no entry for human being, see http://cancerweb.ncl.ac.uk/cgi-
bin/omd?action=Search+OMD&query=human+being, but its definitions for “person” are 
“[t]he bodily form of a human being” and “[a] human being spoken of indefinitely; one; 
a man; as, any person present.” See http://cancerweb.ncl.ac.uk/cgi-bin/omd?action= 
Search+OMD&query=person. 
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unique, living human being.’”154  It is, instead, “a question left for phi-
losophical, religious, moral, and ethical discourse.”155  Doctors, or in 
the case of the law, States, cannot therefore just define a word in whi-
chever way they want in order for it to qualify as scientific.  This is not 
how science works. 
Given the range of perspectives and beliefs about the beginning of 
life, a definition of “human being” or when life actually begins is 
ideological in nature.  The implications of this conclusion are dis-
cussed in Part VI. 
V.  STATE STATUTES AND QUESTIONABLE DEFINITIONS 
A.  Challenges to Statutes That Define When Life Begins 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Rounds which lifted the injunc-
tion on South Dakota’s informed consent statute was surprising, giv-
en the fact that federal courts have consistently struck down statutes 
that attempt to define when human life begins.  Even as early as 1980, 
courts used Roe to strike down states’ informed consent statutes if 
they included definitions of human life.  In Margaret S. v. Edwards,156 a 
Louisiana district court struck down a statute which required a doctor 
to tell his patient that “the unborn child is a human life from the 
moment of conception.”157  The court deemed this requirement un-
constitutional in light of Roe’s conclusion that this morally compli-
cated determination was not the State’s to ascertain.158 
A similar opportunity was given to an Illinois district court that 
same year in Charles v. Carey.  The court entered a preliminary injunc-
tion on certain sections of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975.  The Act 
would have required physicians to deliver a written statement to pa-
tients that included the statement that “the State of Illinois wants you 
to know that in its view the child you are carrying is a living human 
being whose life should be preserved.  Illinois strongly encourages 
you not to have an abortion but to go through to childbirth.”159  
When the case went to the Seventh Circuit, parts of the Act, including 
 
154 See Appellees’ Brief at 30, Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (No. 05-3093).  Dr. Wolpe is the Director 
of the Center for Ethics at Emory University and serves as the first Chief of Bioethics for 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 
155 Id. at 31. 
156 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980). 
157 Id. at 205 n.76 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1299.35.6(B)(3)). 
158 Id. at 209 (“This statement disregards Roe’s finding that the state may not make a deter-
mination that life begins at the moment of conception . . . .”). 
159 S.B. 47 § 3.5(2). 
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this one, were held unconstitutional, but the court of appeals did not 
mention the First Amendment at all in the decision.160 
The Supreme Court had its own chance to rule on ideological 
language in an informed consent statute in City of Akron v. Akron Cen-
ter for Reproductive Health, Inc.161  The Court held that the requirement 
that physicians inform their patients that “the unborn child is a hu-
man life from the moment of conception”162 was inconsistent with 
Roe’s holding that “a State may not adopt one theory of when life be-
gins to justify its regulation of abortions.”163  This case was later over-
ruled, but the unconstitutionality of this particular section of the sta-
tute remains debatable.164 
The ensuing years did not offer much opportunity for any courts 
to hear challenges to such statutes because states did not enact them.  
Though informed consent regulations were challenged on other 
fronts, statutes simply were not written that attempted to personify 
the fetus.  Eventually, in 2007, a case came that did not challenge the 
language in a statute but rather the lack thereof.  The New Jersey 
state case Acuna v. Turkish165 directly addressed the question of 
whether doctors could be forced to define when life begins.  A pa-
tient brought the proceeding and alleged that her doctor should 
have told her, when seeking her consent to the abortion, that her 
embryo “was a complete, separate, unique and irreplaceable human 
being.”166  The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled against her and 
found that because there is no consensus on the issue of when life 
begins, a doctor does not have to tell a woman considering an abor-
tion that an embryo is an existing, living human being.167  Although 
the Court did not address the potential violation of physicians’ First 
 
160 Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980).  But see Berg, supra note 42, at 176 n.97 
(proposing that under the new standard established by Casey, this statute could survive 
constitutional review today). 
161 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
162 Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1186 (1979) (cit-
ing Akron Codified Ordinances 160-1978 § 1870.06). 
163 Akron, 462 U.S. at 444. 
164 See supra Part III.B.1 for a more extended discussion of this case. 
165 930 A.2d 416 (N.J. 2007) (finding that there was support in neither New Jersey nor fed-
eral law for imposing a legal duty on doctors to communicate to patients that an embryo 
is a human being). 
166 Id. at 420. 
167 Id. at 418 (“There is not even remotely a consensus among New Jersey’s medical commu-
nity or citizenry that the plaintiff’s assertions are medical facts, as opposed to firmly held 
moral, philosophical, and religious beliefs, to support the establishment of the duty she 
would impose on all physicians.”). 
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Amendment rights in such a statement, it did find that the proposed 
language reflected a value judgment—not a medical fact.168 
This line of cases supports the argument that the term “human 
being” does not belong in any informed consent to abortion statute.  
Though it is true that South Dakota did not use the term “person,” 
the buzzword which would immediately raise red flags given Roe’s 
clear holding that this is not for the courts to define, using the term 
“human being” in its place conveys essentially the same idea.  Even 
South Dakota conceded that “whether or not the prospective patient 
understands the difference between the scientific term ‘human be-
ing’ versus the legal term ‘person,’ is of significance only if the state-
ment actually given is found to be false and misleading.”169  According 
to Casey, however, the statement only need be false or misleading for 
it to be unconstitutional.  The misleading nature of South Dakota’s 
statutory language is discussed in the following section. 
B.  A Linguistic Ruse 
As in the abortion debate as a whole, language choice in statutes is 
crucial.  Language about abortion spans the spectrum from scath-
ing,170 to more neutral,171 to reassuring,172 to everything in between.  
Advocates on both sides of the debate place importance on words 
used to craft their messages.  In fact, there are websites that offer ex-
 
168 Id. at 422.  But see Tina Kelley, New Jersey Top Court Rejects Woman’s Malpractice Suit on Abor-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2007, at B3, in which Marie Tasy, executive director of New Jer-
sey Right to Life, strongly disagreed with the decision and stated that “[o]nce again the 
court relies upon an outdated, schizophrenic mentality to the detriment of women, and 
they are indulging in a game of semantic gymnastics to avoid the indisputable fact that a 
child in the womb is a human being.” 
169 Appellants’ Brief at 27, Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 
(8th Cir. 2008) (No. 05-3093). 
170 See, e.g., Abortion is Murder!, http://www.jesus-issavior.com/Evils%20in%20America/
Abortion%20is%20Murder/abortion_is_murder.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) (“Upon 
seeing these [graphic] signs, an angry pro-choice mother asked, ‘How can you allow little 
children to see those horrible pictures?’  The pro-life mother wisely responded, ‘How can 
you allow little children to be those horrible pictures?’”).  Sites like this also speak to the 
fact that imagery, paired with strong language, is a tool used by the anti-choice movement 
to convey its message.  It is largely for this reason that many states are currently trying to 
enact ultrasound statutes, as a means of forcing women to view images of fetuses.  See infra 
notes 200–01 and accompanying text. 
171 See, e.g., Little, supra note 116, at 36 (explaining that Professor Barbara Katz Rothman 
represents that sometimes a “decision[] to abort . . . [is] not a decision to destroy, but a 
refusal to create”). 
172 See, e.g., National Abortion Federation, http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/   
index.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) (“Abortion is one of the safest medical procedures 
provided in the United States and Canada today.”). 
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plicit instructions for language to use that will counter the other 
side’s arguments.173  The purposeful construction of “the Fetus as a 
Human Person” rhetoric is a recognized and studied goal of those 
who oppose abortion.174  If this is a strategy used to gain supporters 
generally, why should tactics be any different in the legislative con-
text? 
There is nothing in South Dakota’s statutory description of the 
“unique, whole, living human being” that is unique to the fetal life 
form.  A baby, a child, and even an adult could easily be described us-
ing this broad phrase.  This is semantic manipulation.175  The descrip-
tion can be equally applied to both what is in the womb and what is 
walking around on the street, yet these are different entities that de-
serve to be recognized as such in the eyes of the law.176  This modifica-
tion of the term “human being” by the preceding adjectives makes it 
clear that the State is trying to convince a woman that the entity grow-
 
173 See, e.g., American Life League, Talk the Talk, http://www.all.org/action_talkthetalk.php 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2009) (explaining that “[i]f you want to speak up for the babies, 
you’ve got to know the language”); National Right to Life, What is the Pro-life Response to 
Abortionists’ Arguments?, http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/facts/abortionresponses.html (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2009) (providing “pro-life” responses to five main pro-choice arguments); 
National Abortion Federation, Speaking Positively about Abortion, 
http://www.prochoice.org/get_involved/pro_choice_proud.html (last visited Oct. 3, 
2009) (“It is important for those who understand the importance of keeping abortion 
safe, legal, and accessible to speak out about the importance of this critical reproductive 
health option . . . .”). 
174 Nick Hopkins & Steve Reicher, Social Movement Rhetoric and the Social Psychology of Collective 
Action:  A Case Study of Anti-Abortion Mobilization, 50 HUM. REL. 261, 273 (1997). 
175 But see Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, The Wrong of Abortion, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 
IN APPLIED ETHICS, supra note 116, at 13, 14 (defending the notion that a human embryo 
is unique, human, and whole by describing it in terms that are unique to a developing 
organism).  Lee and George write: 
[I]t is from the start distinct from any cell of the mother of the father.  This is clear 
because it is growing in its own distinct direction.  Its growth is internally directed 
to its own survival and maturation.  Second, the embryo is human:  it has the ge-
netic makeup characteristic of human beings.  Third, and most importantly, the 
embryo is a complete or whole organism, though immature.  The human embryo, 
from conception onward, is fully programmed actively to develop himself or her-
self to the mature stage of a human being, and, unless prevented by disease of violence, 
will actually do so, despite possibly significant variation in environment . . . . 
  Id. 
176 Many states, however, continue to try to personify the fetus as much as is possible.  Writ-
ten materials provided to women in North Dakota, for example, communicate that “fetus 
is ‘a Latin word meaning young one or offspring,’” and that “at 10 weeks’ gestation, the 
fetus ‘now has a distinct human appearance.’”  Gold & Nash, supra note 16, at 10.  
Though the state may include this language in its own written materials, which the doctor 
is not required to communicate, messages are held to a different standard when speech 
rights are at stake. 
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ing inside of her is a little person, which is more than a little uncon-
stitutional.177 
In defense of its language, South Dakota contended that those 
who would exclude application of the terms “human being” and 
“Homo sapien” to the fetus aim to “effectively preclude frank discus-
sion, in scientific terms, of the implications of abortion.  Such a re-
sult,” the State boldly claimed, “is surely inconsistent with the princi-
ples of the First Amendment.”178  This logic is intensely flawed and 
turns the First Amendment on its head.  A doctor remains free to say 
whatever he or she deems medically necessary, even if the words are 
not scripted and compelled by the State; preclusion of purported 
“frank discussion,”179 as the State puts it, assumes that doctors will only 
convey information required by law.  Indeed, what would seem the 
greater impediment to frank discussion is South Dakota’s require-
ment that all of a physician’s answers to a woman’s questions be put 
in writing and kept in her medical file.180  Knowing that all questions 
one has about a sensitive medical procedure are documented could 
keep a woman from speaking frankly with her doctor.  Simply not in-
cluding the term “human being” in the informed consent script does 
not violate the First Amendment at all; to suggest otherwise indicates 
a poor understanding of the Constitution. 
C.  Unnecessary to the Practice of Medicine 
The bigger question that remains to be answered is whether inclu-
sion of the term “human being” is necessary to the practice of medi-
cine.  States may use their police powers in the medical field to pro-
tect the public and ensure that they are not harmed but this power is 
limited to the regulation of health and safety.181  In its standard for-
mulation, informed consent does not require disclosure of a risk that 
“is either known to the patient or is so obvious as to justify presump-
 
177 Robert Post, supra note 3, at 959, argues that the adjectives “do not even purport to have 
biological or scientific content.  Their meaning comes entirely from the moral debate 
that surrounds abortion, because they emphasize the status of the fetus as a distinct and 
independent member of the human community.”  He also points out that biologically, “a 
nonviable fetus is neither ‘whole’ nor ‘separate,’ because it cannot survive outside its rela-
tionship with its mother.”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
178 Appellants’ Brief at 37, Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 
(8th Cir. 2008) (No. 05-3093). 
179 Id. 
180 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2009). 
181 See supra Part II.E. 
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tion of such knowledge.”182  As defined in the statute, it may appear 
true that “abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, 
unique, living human being.”183  But why is such information neces-
sary for securing a patient’s informed consent?  Does use of this term 
really protect a patient’s health and safety? 
The sole purpose of an abortion is to terminate a pregnancy, yet 
the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion184 made it seem like a 
woman who voluntarily goes to a clinic to get this procedure has no 
clue about the purpose of her visit.  The Task Force stated that 
Planned Parenthood “fails to inform the pregnant mother in any lan-
guage that her unborn child is in existence,”185 and that therefore 
“[i]t is impossible for a woman to give informed consent to an abor-
tion if she does not fully understand that her child is in existence and 
that she is consenting to the termination of the life of her child.”186 
That the Task Force felt compelled to explain that a developing 
fetus is actually a “human being” assumes that women do not under-
stand the basic elements of reproduction.187  The utter absurdity of 
this “disclosure” is not lost on legal scholars.  Robert Post observes, 
tongue in cheek, that “[i]t hardly seems plausible that a woman could 
be confused about whether she is carrying the biological fetus of a 
zebra, a raccoon, or a bat.”188  “Just think of all those scores of women 
who have flocked to abortion clinics under the sad misimpression 
that they were carrying developing dolphins,” mused another com-
 
182 Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (Md. 1977); see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 
772, 788 (D.C. Cir 1972) (“[T]here is no obligation to communicate those [dangers] of 
which persons of average sophistication are aware.”). 
183 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2009). 
184 REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION (2005), 
http://www.voteyesforlife.com/docs/Task_Force_Report.pdf (established by H.B. 1233, 
2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005)) [hereinafter Task Force Report].  The Task Force also 
concluded that “the mother has an existing and important and beneficial relationship 
with her child that is irrevocably terminated by the abortion procedure.”  Id. at 13. 
185 Id. at 16. 
186 Id. 
187 In 2003, there were 819 abortions performed in South Dakota and out of the 819 women 
who filled out the requisite state information forms, only five requested that additional 
written information be mailed to them.  Id. at 14 (citing S.D. DEP’T OF HEALTH, SOUTH 
DAKOTA VITAL STATISTICS REPORT 71 (2003), available at 
http://internetdev.state.sd.us/SDWebInfo/DOH/doh/Stats/2003VitalStats/index.htm).  
The Task Force interpreted this ratio to mean that 99.4% of the women “received no in-
formation about the development of the unborn child except the information required by 
[the statute].”  Id. (emphasis added).  Such an interpretation not only assumes that these 
women would have no other methods of accessing information, it also assumes that doc-
tors would not communicate information outside of a state mandate.  This is a paternalis-
tic view of both women and their physicians. 
188 Post, supra note 3, at 954. 
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mentator.189  “The women of South Dakota can rest safely in the 
knowledge that, thanks to their wise legislators, they will at last under-
stand the mystery of their pregnancy . . . .”190 
This paternalistic Task Force report ushered in a paternalistic law 
with what was essentially “linguistic smoke and mirrors.”191  As a result, 
the statute now conveys a misleading state ideology through a me-
dium—the physician—whose constitutional right takes an apparent 
back seat to South Dakota’s ideology-driven excursion. 
VI.  DOCTORS AS PUPPETS OF THE STATE:  IMPLICATIONS 
Imitation may be the sincerest form of flattery, but in the case of 
the South Dakota statute, it is a dangerous trend.  Other states have 
already begun to follow South Dakota’s lead and introduce legislation 
that includes language mimicking word for word that found in South 
Dakota’s informed consent to abortion statute.  A North Dakota bill 
was introduced in early 2009 and has already been enacted into law.192  
Kansas followed suit in March 2009; its House passed a nearly identi-
cal bill with a vote of 82–40.193  Both of these require that physicians 
inform patients that abortion will “terminate the life of a whole, sepa-
rate, unique, living human being” and they define “human being” 
exactly the same way the South Dakota legislature did.194  Based on 
the quick responses of these two states, it is easy to imagine that other 
states will continue to introduce similar legislation in their own re-
gions.  No longer will the effect of this constitutional violation be felt 
solely among South Dakota practitioners and patients. 
Besides creating this statutory ripple effect of sorts on physician 
speech, South Dakota’s statute has broader consequences for the 
 
189 Posting of Caitlin E. Borgmann to Reproductive Rights Prof Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/reproductive_rights/2008/06/eighth-circui-1.html 
(June 28, 2008) (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). 
190 Id.  
191 Appellees’ Brief at 34–35, Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds 530 F.3d 
724 (8th Cir. 2008) (No. 05-3093). 
192 Abortion Control Act, H.B. 1445, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2009), amending N.D. CODE 
14-02.1-02. Tom Freier of the North Dakota Family Alliance explained his support for the 
Bill, stating that “[a]s obvious as this disclosure is, it is necessary for the woman to be fully 
informed before giving her ‘informed consent’ to this procedure which will terminate the 
life of this unborn little boy or girl.”  Steven Ertelt, North Dakota House Backs Bill Telling 
Women Abortion Kills a Human Being, LIFENEWS.COM, Feb. 16, 2009, 
http://www.lifenews.com/state3856.html. 
193 H.B. 2206 (Kan. 2009), amending K.S.A. § 65-6709; KAN. J. OF THE HOUSE, Mar. 4, 2009, 
262. 
194 N.D. H.B. 1445; Kan. H.B. 2206.  Neither of these state’s bills have been voted on in their 
respective Senates to date. 
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field of medicine.  Most directly, it threatens the relationships be-
tween doctors and their patients.  This relationship must be founded 
on trust, but such dependence could be hard to come by if patients 
believe that the advice given to them comes not from the sphere of 
medicine but from the halls of the legislature.195  “Patients should not 
accept, and [the medical] profession should not allow, physicians to 
become a mouthpiece of state-sponsored ideology,”196 asserted four 
doctors in a New England Journal of Medicine editorial.  Sanctioning 
this practice would jeopardize the integrity of physician-patient rela-
tionships well beyond the confines of any abortion clinic. 
The danger of inserting state ideology in abortion scripts extends 
towards other medical procedures.  If states can get away with man-
dating ideological speech about conceptions of life, it is quite possi-
ble that they could do the same in areas such as contraception,197 end-
of-life decisions,198 and stem cell research.199  Also troubling is the po-
tential to pair scripts requiring the identification of the fetus as a 
“human being” with mandatory ultrasound viewing requirements.200  
 
195 See Curfman, supra note 52, at 2485 (“[C]an a patient trust any interaction with his or her 
physician knowing that the physician’s very words have been mandated by the state?”). 
196 Id. 
197 See 45 C.F.R. § 88 (2008) (“The purpose of this Part is to . . . . protect the rights of health 
care entities/entities . . . to refuse to perform health care services and research activities 
to which they may object for religious, moral, ethical, or other reasons.”).  Though later 
overturned, this Department of Health and Human Services regulation empowered fed-
eral officials to cut off federal funding for any state or local government, hospital, health 
plan, clinic or other entity that did not abide by existing federal laws requiring them to 
accommodate doctors, nurses, pharmacists and other employees who refused to partici-
pate in any care they considered objectionable on ethical, moral or religious grounds.  Id.  
See generally Rob Stein, Lawsuits Filed Over Rule That Lets Health Workers Deny Care, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 16, 2009, at A04; David Stout, Medical ‘Conscience Rule’ Is Issued, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/washington/19rule.html.  For a com-
parison of the “Conscience Rule” with the South Dakota Informed Consent statute, see 
Dahlia Lithwick, Nursing Grudges, SLATE, Dec. 6, 2008, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2206042/.  Lithwick inquires why the United States only seems 
to protect the moral convictions of some health workers as opposed to all and observes 
that though “[t]he freedom and autonomy of doctors who oppose abortion are to be pro-
tected[,] those willing to provide abortions can be forced to deliver a state message with 
which they completely disagree.”  Id. 
198 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION:  AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993) (discussing abortion in the context of “the 
edges of life” and “dying and living”). 
199 See, e.g., Lazzarini, supra note 9, at 2191 (“If legislatures can mandate that physicians pro-
vide women with ideological, vague, intimidating and false information about abortion, 
what is to stop them from intruding further into physican-patient discussing regard-
ing . . . the use of future stem-cell-based therapeutics . . . .”). 
200 For an analysis of state ultrasound statutes, see Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing:  Manda-
tory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 375–79 (2008) (dis-
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As of March 2009, twelve states regulated the provision of ultrasounds 
by abortion providers and six States required verbal counseling or 
written materials to include information on accessing ultrasound ser-
vices.201  If a State were to require that a physician not only present a 
viewing of the ultrasound but also identify the image up on the 
screen as a “human being,” the effect on the woman would be that 
much more pronounced and ideologically misleading.  Though the 
First Amendment principles of the compelled physician speech 
would not change with the addition of this intrauterine screening, 
the moral objective of the state would become that much more crys-
tallized.  If only the legislature would provide some popcorn along 
with this cinematic lesson in ideology for the patient. 
The Eighth Circuit might have already had its say on this issue, 
but with the emergence of identical statutes in other states, it is very 
possible that a new challenge might materialize in a different region 
soon.  If this happens, another circuit might get the chance to rule 
that forced communication of the term “human being” in informed 
consent provisions does in fact violate the First Amendment.  Until 
then, the medical community at large needs to recognize the assault 
on its speech rights that statutes like this pose.  Whether or not they 
approve of abortion, they must realize the broader implications such 
statutes have for their profession.  Legislatures should not be able to 
make up their own definitions of science, nor should they be able to 
impose their own ideologies onto medical practitioners’ communica-
tion.  It is important that those individuals who realize the unconsti-
tutionality of these requirements work towards defeating similar 
measures in other states.  The Eighth Circuit’s failure to recognize 
the ideological components of the term “human being” ignores Su-
preme Court precedent and implicitly condones turning doctors into 
state puppets.  But ideology must not be scripted and the First 
Amendment must not be overridden by state puppeteers.  This is not 
the show that should be staged under our Constitution. 
 
 
cussing the importance of imagery and arguing that mandatory ultrasounds improperly 
burden a woman’s ability to make a decisions about abortion). 
201 See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF:  REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND 1 
(2009), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf (stating 
information about various states’ requirements for ultrasounds in relation to abortions). 
